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INTRODUCTION
Certain practices of contemporary immigration detention
have been said to “raise a serious constitutional problem.”1 But just
what sort of constitutional problem? Typically, courts assume that
† J.D. 2013, New York University School of Law; B.A., 2004, New York University.
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project.org/. He also thanks the editorial staff of the City University of New York Law
Review.
1 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (“A statute permitting indefinite
detention of an alien would raise a serious constitutional problem.”).
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some feature of detention violates a noncitizen’s personal right to
due process when faced with a deprivation of liberty.2 Embedded
within that assumption is one of immigration law’s most vexing
questions: to what degree is a noncitizen personally entitled to con-
stitutional rights?3 Courts struggle to find a coherent answer.4
The single-minded focus on a noncitizen’s personal right to
due process has obscured a serious structural constitutional prob-
lem of contemporary immigration detention: the executive’s role
as both jailor and judge when depriving an individual’s  liberty.5
The consolidation of jailer and judge causes a serious structural
constitutional concern because it undermines the separation of
powers and interbranch checks and balances that the Framers un-
derstood to be at the heart of the Due Process Clause.6 Unre-
strained by structural requirements of judicial review found in
criminal detention, the Executive Branch instead uses immigration
detention to incarcerate more than half a million individuals per
year in penal conditions,7 over ten thousand of them for pro-
2 See, e.g., Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003) (“It is well established that the
Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings.”
(quoting Reno v. Flores, 597 U.S. 292, 306 (1993))).
3 See, e.g., David D. Cole, Against Citizenship as a Predicate for Basic Rights, 75 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 2541, 2544 (2007) (“Time and again, the Administration has argued that
foreign nationals do not deserve the same rights as citizens, and that we can do to
them what we could not do to ourselves.”).
4 Compare Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060, 1087 (9th Cir. 2015) (noting that
a noncitizen’s liberty interest demands that the burden of persuasion at a bond hear-
ing be placed on the government), cert. granted sub nom. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 136 S.
Ct. 2489 (2016), with Sopo v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 825 F.3d 1199, 1219-20 (11th Cir.
2016) (approving placement of burden of persuasion at bond hearing on
noncitizen).
5 “Structural due process,” developed by Lawrence Tribe in Structural Due Process,
10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. R. 269 (1976), was later summarized by Burt Neuborne as the
principle “that channelling difficult decisions to the most appropriate bodies will min-
imize the likelihood that a current value judgment will conflict with the ambiguously
expressed will of the Founders.” Judicial Review and Separation of Powers in France and the
United States, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 363, 365 (1982). In the same article, Neuborne briefly
described the French Constitutional Council’s decision to strike a statute authorizing
seven days of immigration detention without judicial review based on concerns re-
garding separation of powers and the institutional suitability of the executive to adju-
dicate the propriety of detention. Id. at 398 (citing Judgment of Jan. 9, 1980, Con.
const., No. 79-109DC).
6 “Separation of powers differs from checks and balances. One protects individual
liberty by allocating particular governmental powers to specific branches. The other
protects individual liberty by having each branch restrain the others.” Eric M. Freed-
man, Habeas Corpus in Three Dimensions Dimension III: Habeas Corpus as an Instrument of
Checks and Balances, 8 NE. U.L.J. 251, 253 (2016) (internal quotations omitted).
7 See Office of the Press Sec’y, DHS Releases End of Year Fiscal Year 2016 Statistics,
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY (Dec. 30, 2016), https://perma.cc/5B5P-WDDE
(reporting FY 2016 detention figure of 530,250).
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longed periods ranging from six months to multiple years.8 Those
who experience the longest average detention time are citizens,
others erroneously charged as deportable, and individuals with
meritorious claims for immigration status.9
More than sixty years ago, the Supreme Court relied on “long-
standing practice” and “special considerations applicable to depor-
tation” to approve the Executive’s dual role as enforcement agent
and adjudicator when the government makes decisions to deport.10
But it has yet to address the consolidation of jailer and judge in
decisions to detain, a distinct governmental power with unique
constitutional limits.11 Because the Framers understood due pro-
cess to mandate the separation of jailer and judge when the gov-
ernment deprives an individual of liberty, contemporary
immigration detention attacks structural norms of government
that the Constitution charges the judiciary to defend. As I explain,
preoccupation with such structural constitutional concerns can be
found throughout majority and dissenting opinions in the Su-
preme Court’s modern immigration detention cases. Courts
8 In recent years, as immigration court processing times have reached record
highs, immigration detention has de facto separated into two regimes, one relatively
short-term and the other indefinitely long. Annual numbers are certain to vary, but a
2012 analysis of individuals leaving detention over a two-month period found that
70% were released after less than a month. Of that group, over three quarters were
deported. Of those in detention for longer than a month, 1,792 had been detained
for longer than six months. Those numbers gave an estimated annual figure of more
than 10,000 prolonged detentions of over six months. Transactional Records Access
Clearinghouse, Legal Noncitizens Receive Longest ICE Detention, TRACIMMIGRATION (June
3, 2013), https://perma.cc/X5UC-3F7S. A 2009 study estimated the rate of pro-
longed detention (between 90 days and six months) to be even higher, at 13% of the
detained population, or over 2,400 people, on any given day. DONALD KERWIN &
SERENA YI-YING LIN, MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE, IMMIGRATION DETENTION: CAN ICE
MEET ITS LEGAL IMPERATIVES AND CASE MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITIES? 16 (2009).
More recently, a study of the prolonged immigration detention population in the
Central District of California uncovered an average detention length of 421 days for
those detained longer than six months and still pursuing immigration relief. Individ-
ual actions before the federal courts provide anecdotal evidence of detentions that
have lasted for years at a time. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, PROLONGED DETENTION
FACT SHEET 1 (last visited Dec. 2, 2017), https://perma.cc/TKR9-NYML.
9 See Legal Noncitizens Receive Longest ICE Detention, supra note 8 (reporting that in a
two-month sample of individuals released in 2012, finding the longest average deten-
tion time occurred for those whose cases were terminated by an immigration judge or
the prosecutor herself, indicating that the government was unable to prove its charges
of alienage or deportability or that the noncitizen qualified for and was granted relief
from removal).
10 Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 311 (1955).
11 See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (stating in a decision addressing
immigration detention  that Congress’ plenary power to create immigration law is
subject to “important constitutional limitations”).
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should therefore explicitly consider these structural concerns when
evaluating the constitutionality of immigration detention practices.
I begin by summarizing historical research on the meaning of
due process at common law and the Founding to explain how the
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause provides the structural
guarantee of separation of jailer from judge. I then describe the
Executive’s dual roles of jailer and judge when detaining individu-
als who are contesting deportation in removal proceedings.12 After
highlighting the unexamined role that structural due process con-
cerns play in the Supreme Court’s modern immigration detention
cases, I conclude by considering detention practices that might be
challenged on structural due process grounds.
By focusing on separation of powers and related structural
constitutional concerns, I supplement distinct scholarly critiques of
contemporary immigration detention. Others have written, for ex-
ample, of structural infirmities that might lead to bias in general
immigration decision making,13 institutional design features that
result in unjustified detention,14 and a detention system that lacks
minimum standards of due process.15 Most recently, scholarship
has questioned whether some of the detention practices I identify
below withstand scrutiny under the Fourth Amendment’s prohibi-
tion of unreasonable seizures.16 I agree that such concerns merit
consideration by courts and policymakers, but ask here the distinct
question whether certain features of contemporary immigration
12 In removal proceedings, an individual can contest the charges of removability
or, if qualified, apply for a waiver of an immigration law violation that permits her to
remain in the country with immigration status or other protection from deportation.
13 Sydenham B. Alexander III, A Political Response to Crisis in the Immigration Courts,
21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 11-36 (2006) (arguing that immigration courts systematically
fail to apply law); Michele Benedetto, Crisis on the Immigration Bench, 73 BROOK. L. REV.
467 (2008) (considering structural features of immigration court that permit political
control and encourage ethical violations); Kari E. Hong, Removing Citizens: Parenthood,
Immigration Courts, and Derivative Citizenship, 28 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 277, 331-42 (2014)
(describing structural infirmities with immigration adjudication); Stephen H. Legom-
sky, Deportation and the War on Independence, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 369, 370 (2006) (argu-
ing that executive reforms to immigration adjudication have discouraged
independent decision making); Fatma E. Marouf, Implicit Bias and Immigration Courts,
45 NEW ENG. L. REV. 417, 417 (2011) (examining how factors such as immigration
judges’ lack of independence, limited opportunity for deliberate thinking, low moti-
vation, and the low risk of judicial review all allow implicit bias to drive decision
making).
14 See Alina Das, Immigration Detention: Information Gaps and Institutional Barriers to
Reform, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 137 (2013) (arguing that institutional design choices under-
lying the immigration detention system lead to over-detention).
15 See Cole, supra note 3, at 1008-15.
16 Michael Kagan, Immigration Law’s Looming Fourth Amendment Problem, 104 GEO.
L.J. 125, 129 (2015).
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detention violate the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of due process
as understood by its historical meaning: the structural separation
of jailer from judge.
I. THE HISTORICAL ROOTS OF STRUCTURAL DUE PROCESS
IN DETENTION DECISIONS
What does due process demand when the government de-
prives an individual of liberty? Legal historians have come to un-
derstand that the answer to this question is, at least in part,
structural in nature. The historical origins of due process, its devel-
opment at common law in both England and the American colo-
nies, and its subsequent inclusion in the Bill of Rights, support the
view that “due process has from the beginning been bound up with
the division of the authority to deprive subjects of life, liberty, or
property between independent political institutions.”17 As under-
stood from the drafting of the Magna Carta to the ratification of
the Bill of Rights, due process prohibited the consolidation of
jailer and judge in the same governmental body.
The Fifth Amendment acknowledges that the government will
inevitably attempt to deprive persons of liberty. Instead of offering
absolute protection from that power, it places an absolute condi-
tion on its use: “No person shall be . . . deprived of . . . liberty . . .
without due process of law . . . .”18 The use of the modifier “due” is
often understood to imply varying levels of process “as the particu-
lar situation demands,”19 a flexible remedy that can be difficult to
define with precision.20 But historically, “due process of law” has
always reflected at least one specific, fundamental principle: the
separation of jailer from judge. At its core, due process has been
expressed as the “promise[ ] that the Executive must answer to an
impartial body with a valid cause for depriving one of his or her
liberty.”21 It “ensure[s] that the executive [will] not be able unilat-
17 Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of Powers,
121 YALE L.J. 1672, 1681 (2012).
18 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
19 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
20 See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Re-
view, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 309 (1993) (“Due process
doctrine subsists in confusion.”).
21 Amanda L. Tyler, Is Suspension A Political Question?, 59 STAN. L. REV. 333, 384
(2006). Others describe due process as a guarantee against both the executive and
legislature, ensuring that any “deprivation of life, liberty, or property” be accompa-
nied by “adjudication by a court according to generally applicable laws.” See also Chap-
man & McConnell, supra note 17, at 1735 (noting that due process is a sufficient basis
for judicial invalidation of legislation).
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erally to deprive persons within the nation of their rights of life,
liberty, or property except as provided by common law or statute
and as adjudicated by independent judicial bodies . . . .”22 The Due
Process Clause is thus “essentially a separation of powers provi-
sion,”23 mandating distinct roles for jailer and judge.24
The written origins of due process are traced to a provision in
the Magna Carta which states “No freemen shall be taken or im-
prisoned or disseised [sic] or exiled or in any way destroyed . . .
except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the
land.”25 The “law of the land” referred to statutes, customs, com-
mon law, and orders directing another arm of the government.26
These legal norms, both substantive and procedural, limited the
king’s autonomy by conditioning certain of his actions on judicial
approval.27 Thus, due process at its origins was a structural limita-
tion on the government: “a guarantee of judgment by an indepen-
dent institution according to procedures designed to take the case
out of the hands of the King.”28
The first recorded use of the term “due process” comes from a
1354 English statute which states, “no Man of what Estate or Condi-
tion that he be, shall be put out of Land or Tenement, nor taken,
nor imprisoned, nor disinherited, nor put to Death, without being
brought in Answer by due Process of the Law.”29 Whatever differ-
ences between the two terms that may have originally existed, by
the 15th century, “ ‘due process of law’ and ‘law of the land’ were
22 Chapman & McConnell, supra note 17, at 1807.
23 Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Objects of the Constitution, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1005,
1043 (2011).
24 See id. (“Individual rights are indeed the beginning and the end of the clause.
But separation of powers is the means and the meaning. The clause protects individ-
ual rights by assigning and channeling federal power.”); see also Martin H. Redish &
Colleen McNamara, Habeas Corpus, Due Process and the Suspension Clause: A Study in the
Foundations of American Constitutionalism, 96 VA. L. REV. 1361, 1386–87 (2010) (“The
Due Process Clause . . . imposed an unequivocal limit on the federal government’s
power to detain individuals summarily . . . . ‘Due process of law,’ at its textual, histori-
cal, and doctrinal cores, at minimum requires the provision of notice, hearing, and a
neutral adjudicator.”).
25 Magna Carta ch. 39, translated in J.C. Holt, Magna Carta 461 (2d ed. 1992).
26 Brandon L. Garrett, Habeas Corpus and Due Process, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 47, 63
(2012).
27 See Chapman & McConnell, supra note 17, at 1684; Ryan C. Williams, The One
and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J. 408, 455–56 (2010) (“At the time
of the Fifth Amendment’s ratification the phrase ‘law of the land’ was widely under-
stood to refer to duly enacted positive law, with a secondary connotation of appropri-
ate judicial proceedings”).
28 Chapman & McConnell, supra note 17, at 1684.
29 Id. at 1682 (quotation omitted).
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interchangeable.”30
By the time the Framers referred to “due process” in the Con-
stitution’s Fifth Amendment, generations of English lawyers had
developed the concept at common law, including Edward Coke,
whose views were “a chief source of early American constitutional-
ism.”31 Coke argued that the monarch’s autonomy was limited both
by positive law enacted by Parliament and common law derived
from adjudication by courts.32 Those principles were codified by
Parliament with the passage of the Petition of Right in 1628, which
permitted the monarch to deprive a subject of liberty only accord-
ing to “the Law of the Land,” “due processe of Lawe” or “by the
lawfull Judgment of his Peeres.”33 This legacy shaped the text of
the Due Process Clause itself. The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause, like the Petition of Right, uses the same syntactic structure
as the Magna Carta.34 All three texts consistently treat due process
as a limit to deprivation rather than a right to liberty.35
In at least one important aspect, however, the British and
American concepts of due process had diverged before the Consti-
tution’s drafting. While Coke viewed due process as a constraint on
the executive alone, early Americans understood it to limit the leg-
islature as well.36 In part, this reflected the colonists’ soured rela-
tionship with both the King and Parliament. But post-colonial
experience also informed the American view of due process as a
limitation on both political branches. Early state governments ex-
30 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 169 (1968) (Black, J., concurring).
31 Chapman & McConnell, supra note 17, at 1684; see also J. Andrew Kent, A Textual
and Historical Case Against a Global Constitution, 95 GEO. L.J. 463, 520 (2007) (“Coke
taught that [due process and law of the land] meant using the customary and funda-
mental common law judicial procedures in proceedings where the life, liberty, or
property of a subject was at issue . . . . It is commonly thought that the Founding
generation understood ‘due process of law’ as Coke had.”).
32 See Chapman & McConnell, supra note 17, at 1686.
33 Id. at 1688 (citing Petition of Right 1628, 3 Car. 1 c. 1, §§ III, IV).
34 Compare Magna Carta ch. 39 (“No freemen shall be taken or imprisoned or dis-
seised [sic] or exiled or in any way destroyed . . . except by the lawful judgment of his
peers or by the law of the land.”), translated in J.C. Holt, Magna Carta 461 (2d ed.
1992) with U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.”).
35 See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. at 169 (Black, J., concurring) (“Chapter
39 of Magna Carta was a guarantee that the government would take neither life, lib-
erty, nor property without a trial in accord with the law of the land that already ex-
isted at the time the alleged offense was committed.”); Rosenkranz, supra note 23, at
1043 (“[F]ar from forbidding executive deprivations of life, liberty, and property, the
clause expressly contemplates that the executive will deprive persons of life, liberty,
and property. The central function of the clause is to create a check on such
deprivations.”).
36 See Chapman & McConnell, supra note 17, at 1699-1703.
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perimented with forms of direct democracy that eschewed checks
on legislative action.37 Some legislatures assumed quasi-judicial
functions by abolishing the right to a jury trial for certain legal
disputes.38 Such experiences informed the Framers’ view that con-
centrating legislative, executive, and judicial functions “in the same
hands is precisely the definition of [despotic] government.”39
When James Madison proposed amending the Constitution with
the Due Process Clause, he recommended it be inserted in Article
I, among other explicit limitations of congressional power.40 Thus,
in addition to forbidding the executive from imprisoning persons
without judicial approval, the Founders understood the Clause to
prohibit the legislature from affirmatively granting the Executive
that power.41
It is common today for courts to discuss a right to due process
as coterminous with an individual’s “liberty interest,” focusing anal-
ysis on the individual acted upon rather than the government ac-
tor.42 But due process at its origins in both common law and
American government was a structural limit on the government’s
ability to deprive liberty rather than a personal guarantee of free-
dom. The minimum understanding of the Due Process Clause
therefore implies consideration of how, and not only on whom, the
government acts. According to that understanding, when the gov-
ernment acts to deprive liberty, it must separate jailer and judge.
37 See id. at 1703 (“[T]hough they to some extent separated the executive and
judicial powers from the legislature, early state constitutions provided few institu-
tional checks on legislative power.”).
38 See id. 1706-13 (describing cases analyzing the constitutionality of the depriva-
tion of a jury trial for disputes regarding transfer of land, seizure of property, qui tam
actions, and stripping of citizenship).
39 THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 170 (2d Am. ed. 1794); see
also Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 29–30 (1991) (“[T]he words ‘due
process of law’ conveyed ‘the same meaning as the words ‘by the law of the land,’ in
Magna Charta ” (referring to Coke’s commentary and early State Constitutions), and
“they were ‘a restraint on the legislature as well as on the executive and judicial pow-
ers of the government.’”) (citing Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement
Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 276 (1855)).
40 Chapman & McConnell, supra note 17, at 1722 (“[Madison] would have put the
Due Process Clause in the section of Article I of the Constitution devoted to enumer-
ating the limits on congressional power, directly following the clause prohibiting Con-
gress from enacting bills of attainder and ex post facto laws.”).
41 Cf. Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 426 (1885) (“The purpose of the [Fifth]
amendment was to limit the powers of the legislature, as well as of the prosecuting
officers, of the United States.”).
42 See infra n. 163-65 and accompanying text.
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II. FROM JAILER TO JUDGE, AND BACK AGAIN: THE EXECUTIVE’S
DUAL ROLES IN IMMIGRATION DETENTION
Contemporary immigration detention raises serious structural
constitutional concerns when considered alongside the historical
meaning of due process as a structural separation of jailer from
judge. Courts now openly question whether immigration detention
is meaningfully different from criminal incarceration.43 Both sys-
tems confine individuals to cells under penal conditions, in many
cases in the same county jails and prisons.44 Both are publicly justi-
fied as systems of deterrence.45 Yet only in criminal incarceration
does the authority to impose ongoing detention “require severance
and disengagement from activities of law enforcement.”46
Immigration detention is, instead, jointly administered by two
law enforcement agencies: the U.S. Department of Homeland Se-
curity (“DHS”) and the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”). From
arrest through appeal of an immigration detention custody deter-
mination, both DHS and DOJ blend the roles of jailer and judge, at
certain points acting as both, at others trading off enforcement
and adjudicatory duties. Below, I describe in greater detail the dual
roles that each agency plays when detaining individuals who are
contesting their deportation in removal proceedings, the adminis-
trative hearing at an immigration court that determines whether
an individual charged as deportable may nonetheless remain in the
United States legally.
43 See, e.g., Chavez-Alvarez v. Warden York Cty. Prison, 783 F.3d 469, 478 (3d Cir.
2015) (“[W]e cannot ignore the conditions of confinement. Chavez–Alvarez is being
held in detention at the York County Prison with those serving terms of imprisonment
as a penalty for their crimes. Among our concerns about deprivations to liberties
brought about by [immigration detention] is the reality that merely calling a confine-
ment ‘civil detention’ does not, of itself, meaningfully differentiate it from penal mea-
sures.” (citations omitted)); Osias v. Decker, No. 17-CV-02786 (VEC), 2017 WL
3242332, at *1 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 2017), vacated as moot, No. 17-CV-02786 (VEC),
2017 WL 3432685 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2017) (“The relevant statute use[s] the term ‘de-
tain’ rather than ‘imprison.’ The softer import of detain does not change the hard
reality: individuals ‘detained’ by the immigration authorities are confined in prison
settings.”).
44 See Ce´sar Cuauhte´moc Garcı´a Herna´ndez, Immigration Detention as Punishment,
61 UCLA L. REV. 1346, 1382-88 (2014) (describing conditions of confinement in im-
migration detention).
45 Compare id. at 1401-02 (discussing deterrence as a traditional justification of pe-
nal incarceration), with R.I.L-R v. Johnson, 80 F. Supp. 3d 164, 175 (D.D.C. 2015)
(“[T]he recent surge in detention during a period of mass migration is not mere
happenstance, but instead reflects a design to deter such migration.”).
46 Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 350 (1972).
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A. Decisions to Detain Made Prior to Initiation of Removal Proceedings
DHS acts as both jailer and judge, absent even review by an-
other executive agency, in the period before it initiates removal
proceedings against an individual. When arresting a suspected
noncitizen, a DHS agent can obtain a pre-arrest warrant not from a
neutral arbiter, but from another DHS agent.47 However, prior ar-
rest authorization is not required if the agent has “reason to be-
lieve that the alien . . . is in the United States in violation of any
[immigration] law or regulation and is likely to escape before a
warrant can be obtained for his arrest.”48
Subsequent to arrest, the U.S. Immigration and Customs En-
forcement (“ICE”), a sub-agency of DHS, alone decides whether it
will refer an arrested individual to removal proceedings and
whether to keep her in detention pending the initiation and com-
pletion of those proceedings.49 A decision to refer does not itself
initiate proceedings, which begin only when ICE files a charging
document with an immigration court.50 Because no law governs
the time by which ICE must file a charging document, an individ-
ual may be detained “for weeks or months awaiting . . . the schedul-
ing of a court date because DHS has not served the [charging
document] on the Immigration Court.”51
In recent years, ICE has substantially increased its use of de-
tention pending removal proceedings. In 94% of cases where an
individual requested a bond hearing from an immigration judge,
ICE has elected to continue detention pending completion of re-
moval proceedings rather than set an initial bond.52 About one-
fourth of those detention decisions are discretionary,53 meaning
ICE decided to continue detention because it believed the individ-
47 8 C.F.R. § 287.5(e) (2017).
48 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2) (2017). Regulations require post-arrest examination by
any agency officer other than the arresting officer. See 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(a) (2017). But,
if a second officer is not “readily available” or her input “would entail unnecessary
delay,” the arresting officer may conduct her own examination. Id. DHS therefore
arrests individuals without any independent oversight, ex-ante or ex-post.
49 See 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(d) (2017).
50 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229 (2017).
51 Bridget Kessler, Comment, In Jail, No Notice, No Hearing . . . No Problem? A Closer
Look at Immigration Detention and the Due Process Standards of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, 24 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 571, 604 (2009).
52 Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, What Happens When Individuals are
Released on Bond in Immigration Court Proceedings?, TRACIMMIGRATION (Sept. 14, 2016),
https://perma.cc/44ZY-8UAA (noting that twenty years prior to 2016, three out of
four bond hearings before an IJ requested lowering a bond amount originally set by
ICE).
53 See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., ICE’S RE-
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ual was a flight risk or a danger to the community.54 The remaining
three-quarters of individuals that ICE declines to release are incar-
cerated in mandatory detention. In these cases, ICE continues de-
tention based on the charge of removability alone. In other words,
the agency does not assess dangerousness or flight risk—the actual
need for detention during removal proceedings—and will not re-
lease an individual even if she can prove she is neither. ICE’s deci-
sion to detain is presumed controlling for the indefinite period
that removal proceedings last—many last years.55
The charges that ICE believes require mandatory detention
are so expansive in scope that is it difficult to consider them a ra-
tional proxy for flight risk or danger unless one imputes those
qualities to all individuals in removal proceedings (an assumption
that does not bear out empirically).56 Mandatory detention charges
include lacking evidence of a right to enter the country;57 over-
staying the ninety-day period prescribed by the Visa Waiver Pro-
gram;58 possessing one or more of an indeterminate class of
criminal convictions;59 and re-entering the country after receiving
a removal order, even if doing so to escape persecution or torture
in a foreign country.60 Individuals charged with these violations
LEASE OF IMMIGRATION DETAINEES 34 (2014), https://perma.cc/F55V-JCBP (76% of
detained individuals were held in mandatory detention in 2013).
54 See 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8) (2017).
55 See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 8, at 4-5 (highlighting individual cases
where detention during removal proceedings lasted years); Transactional Records Ac-
cess Clearinghouse, Ballooning Wait Times for Hearing Dates in Overworked Immigration
Courts, TRACIMMIGRATION (Sept. 21, 2015), https://perma.cc/6NMC-8EBM (report-
ing average wait time of 635 calendar days for a hearing in immigration court).
56 See What Happens When Individuals Are Released on Bond in Immigration Court Pro-
ceedings?, supra note 52 (reporting that 86% of individuals released on bond subse-
quently report to their proceedings).
57 In Saleem v. Shanahan, No. 16-CV-808 (RA), 2016 WL 4435246, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 22, 2016), the court noted that an asylum seeker was properly classified as an
“arriving alien” pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1001.1(q) (2017), and was thus subject to
mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) (2017), which states, “if the examin-
ing immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and
beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding
. . . .”
58 See, e.g., Neziri v. Johnson, 187 F. Supp. 3d 211, 213 (D. Mass. 2016) (noting the
government’s argument that a noncitizen is detainable without bond under authority
in the Visa Waiver Program statute (citing Matter of A–W–, 25 I. & N. Dec. 45 (B.I.A.
2009)).
59 8 U.S.C. § 1126(e) (2017) (forbidding custody redetermination by immigration
judge for individuals described at 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), which includes individuals
charged as removable for range of indeterminate offenses classified under statutory
terms of art, including, for example, crimes involving moral turpitude, aggravated
felonies, and crimes of violence).
60 See, e.g., Padilla-Ramirez v. Bible, 180 F. Supp. 3d. 697 (D. Idaho 2016), aff’d, 862
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can possess widely varied incentives to abscond or indicators of
dangerousness. Many have been referred to an immigration judge
for assessment of humanitarian-based claims for asylum or other
protection from deportation after a DHS officer found they had a
credible fear of persecution in their countries of origin. Some lack
substantial ties to the United States while others are longtime re-
sidents with family, homes, and jobs within the country. Some have
criminal records and others do not. Of those records, some con-
tain only one decades-old conviction that did not result in criminal
incarceration.61
Depending on the grounds for mandatory detention, ICE
claims unreviewable authority to release an individual for purposes
of witness protection, urgent humanitarian reasons, or significant
public benefit.62 To secure such release, the detained individual
must prove to an ICE officer’s satisfaction that she will not pose a
danger to property or persons, or abscond.63 When evaluating hu-
manitarian release requests, officers check a box on a form that
contains neither factual findings nor discussion of a rationale for
their decision.64 There is no appeal of an ICE decision to deny a
humanitarian release request, even to correct blatant errors, as
when an ICE officer confuses two individuals’ files.65
In sum, for the overwhelming majority of individuals detained
prior to the commencement of removal proceedings, DHS both
executes detention and adjudicates its propriety. In all cases, DHS
alone authorizes its arrests. In close to all cases, DHS alone decides
to commit the individual to long-term incarceration during re-
moval proceedings. As many as three-quarters of those detained
long-term cannot appeal DHS’s decision to detain to anyone other
than DHS. No other agency or court may review that appeal.
F.3d 881 (9th Cir. 2017) (finding that an individual previously deported who reen-
tered the country and sought protection from persecution was detainable without
bond).
61 See Adriane Meneses, Comment, The Deportation of Lawful Permanent Residents for
Old and Minor Crimes: Restoring Judicial Review, Ending Retroactivity, and Recognizing De-
portation as Punishment, 14 SCHOLAR 767, 774-76 (2012) (providing examples of indi-
viduals charged as removable due to convictions for shoplifting, turnstile jumping,
and a twenty-year-old conviction for firing a gun into an empty pool).
62 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(c)(2), 1182(d)(5) (2017).
63 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(3) (2017).
64 Respondents’ Supplemental Brief at 25, Jennings v. Rodriguez, 136 S. Ct. 2489
(2016) (No. 15-1204).
65 See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060, 1081 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted
sub nom. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 136 S. Ct. 2489 (2016) (identifying two blatant errors
when denying requests for release, or “parole”: officers had confused Ethiopia with
Somalia and had mixed up two detainees’ files).
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B. Decisions to Detain Made Pending Removal Proceedings
While removal proceedings are ongoing, DHS and DOJ alter-
nate blended roles of jailer and judge. Only one in four detained
individuals may seek review from DOJ of DHS’s decision to detain.
But the impartiality of that review is compromised due to DOJ’s
shared immigration enforcement objectives. As currently prac-
ticed, federal court review by habeas corpus fails to address the se-
rious constitutional concerns caused by this structure of detention
decision making.
1. Executive Review of Detention During Removal
Proceedings
Where the DOJ is permitted to review DHS’s decision to de-
tain pending removal proceedings, substantial barriers to imparti-
ality exist. DOJ’s detention review functions are carried out by
officers from a sub-agency, the Executive Office for Immigration
Review (“EOIR”), at adversarial hearings in which DHS attorneys
advocate for continued detention. Initial review occurs before an
officer called an immigration judge.66 Appeal from an immigration
judge is heard by another EOIR officer or panel of officers at the
Board of Immigration Appeals.67
Though EOIR officers are referred to as “judges,” they lack
common structural protections that promote decisional indepen-
dence from DOJ’s immigration enforcement objectives. EOIR of-
ficers are not employees of an independent judicial branch, for
example, but adjudicatory officers of administrative law housed in
DOJ, the executive agency responsible for prosecution of immigra-
tion-related crime. Unlike other administrative law judges in the
Executive Branch, EOIR officers are not bound by statutory
prohibitions on ex parte communication with government counsel
related to the merits of a proceeding.68
EOIR officers are also vulnerable to political pressure from the
66 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d)(1) (2017).
67 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d)(3).
68 Compare Travis Silva, Note, Toward a Constitutionalized Theory of Immigration Deten-
tion, 31 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 227, 264 (2012) (noting ex parte communication be-
tween government counsel and EOIR supervisory adjudicators), with Rachel E.
Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 1022 (2006)
(describing “structural rules designed to ensure impartiality” of an administrative law
judge imposed by the Administrative Procedures Act, including removal after notice
and hearing before a Merit Systems Protection Board and a prohibition on ex parte
communications related to the merits of the proceedings). But see EXEC. OFFICE FOR
IMMIGRATION REVIEW & NAT’L ASS’N OF IMMIGRATION JUDGES, ETHICS AND PROFESSION-
ALISM GUIDE FOR IMMIGRATION JUDGES 15 (2011), https://perma.cc/V4V8-HK3T (stat-
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U.S. Attorney General, who as head of DOJ shapes both the corps
of EOIR officers who review detention decisions and the substance
of the law they adjudicate. One Supreme Court Justice recognized
this capacity to influence EOIR decision making when he de-
scribed the Board of Immigration Appeals as “only advisory” to the
Attorney General, noting that the agency is “neither a judicial body
nor an independent agency. It is created by the Attorney General
as part of his office, he names its members, and they are responsi-
ble only to him. It operates under his supervision and direction,
and its every decision is subject to his unlimited review and
revision.”69
The Attorney General exercises indirect influence over EOIR
detention adjudication through personnel decisions. Because
EOIR officers serve at the pleasure of the Attorney General, they
may be summarily fired if she disagrees with the content of their
decisions.70 Short of termination, the Attorney General can reas-
sign EOIR officers to geographically isolated courts, or engage in
partisan hiring practices.71 Past internal DOJ investigations uncov-
ered evidence of the “systematic use of political or ideological affili-
ations in screening candidates” for immigration judgeships.72 Of
the eighty-four immigration judges hired between June 2016 and
June 2017, approximately three-quarters worked previously as im-
migration enforcement attorneys within ICE or as prosecutors
within DOJ.73 Some view this “systemic lack of institutional inde-
pendence” as the root of EOIR’s “inability to apply the law in an
even fashion.”74 Immigration judges themselves argue that DOJ
policies rob them of institutional independence to adjudicate
ing limited circumstances in which ex parte communication between an immigration
judge and a party should be permitted).
69 United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 269–70 (1954) (Jack-
son, J., dissenting); see also Evolution of the U.S. Immigration Court System: Pre-1983, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE (last updated Apr. 30, 2015), https://perma.cc/QXM5-GF9G (“The
BIA was and remains . . .  responsible solely to the Attorney General in reviewing and
deciding immigration case appeals.”). The BIA was originally created by the Attorney
General in 1940, 5 Fed. Reg. 3, 502 (Sept. 4, 1940). In 1983, it was subsequently
placed within EOIR. 48 Fed. Reg. 8,038 (Feb. 25, 1983). However, the reorganization
did not affect its independence.
70 See Silva, supra note 68, at 264.
71 Id.
72 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AN INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZED HIRING
BY MONICA GOODLING AND OTHER STAFF IN THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 137
(2008), https://oig.justice.gov/special/s0807/final.pdf.
73 CATHOLIC LEGAL IMMIGRATION NETWORK, INC., IMMIGRATION COURT PRACTI-
TIONER’S GUIDE: RESPONDING TO INAPPROPRIATE IMMIGRATION JUDGE CONDUCT 8
(2017), https://perma.cc/7WNF-KMJN.
74 Silva, supra note 68, at 264.
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whether an individual may safely be released on bond.75 Federal
courts sitting in review of EOIR have called it “the least competent
federal agency,”76 noting “excessive judicial passivity,”77 a “dis-
turbing pattern of . . . misconduct,”78 and findings “grounded
solely on speculation and conjecture.”79 Judges at the U.S. Courts
of Appeals have concluded “that the adjudication of these cases at
the administrative level has fallen below the minimum standards of
legal justice,”80 and that federal courts provide “the first meaning-
ful review that the petitioner has . . . .”81
The Attorney General’s influence over EOIR detention deci-
sions can also take a more direct form in response to political pres-
sure from the executive. She may refer for her own consideration
any EOIR custody decision and summarily reverse it without notice
to the detained individual.82 Upon referral, she may receive addi-
tional evidence and make de novo factual and legal determinations
that a detained individual may not have an opportunity to con-
test.83 The Attorney General may also control the substantive crite-
75 See Legomsky, supra note 13, at 373.
76 Chavarria–Reyes v. Lynch, 845 F.3d 275, 280 (7th Cir. 2016) (Posner, J.,
dissenting).
77 Bouras v. Holder, 779 F.3d 665, 682 (7th Cir. 2015) (Posner, J., dissenting), reh’g
en banc granted, opinion vacated sub. nom. Bouras v. Lynch, No. 14-2179, 2015 BL
224445 (7th Cir. July 14, 2015).
78 Qun Wang v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 423 F.3d 260, 268 (3d Cir. 2005).
79 Jin Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 104, 115 (2d Cir. 2005).
80 Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 830 (7th Cir. 2005).
81 Adam Liptak, Courts Criticize Judges’ Handling of Asylum Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
26, 2005), https://perma.cc/322Y-A2PL (quoting John M. Walker Jr., chief judge of
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, at a conference in September of
2005).
82 See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h) (2017); see also Bijal Shah, The Attorney General’s Disrup-
tive Immigration Power, 102 IOWA L. REV. ONLINE 129, 133 (2017) (“[T]he referral and
review mechanism lacks ‘notice to the parties and publication of intent to refer a case,
notice upon actual referral for review, and the identification of issues to be resolved
by the Attorney General and an opportunity to submit briefing.’” (quotation omit-
ted)); Justin Chasco, Comment, Judge Alberto Gonzales? The Attorney General’s Power to
Overturn Board of Immigration Appeals’ Decisions, 31 S. ILL. U.L.J. 363, 381 (2007) (“The
power to overturn a Board decision decreases the independence of the Board by giv-
ing the chief policy maker direct oversight of decisions of the Board.”).
83 See Matter of D-J-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 572, 575 (A.G. 2003) (when hearing a case on
referral, the Attorney General retains full authority to receive additional evidence and
to make de novo factual determinations); Matter of Joseph Patrick Thomas Doherty,
12 Op. O.L.C. 1, 4 (1988) (“[R]espondent was notified that the Attorney General
would consider [evidence not previously considered by BIA or immigration judge]
and was given an opportunity to respond on the merits to the facts and reasoning
contained in it, an opportunity which respondent has exercised.”). But see Laura S.
Trice, Note, Adjudication by Fiat: The Need for Procedural Safeguards in Attorney General
Review of Board of Immigration Appeals Decisions, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1766, 1778-79 (2010)
(discussing Matter of Silva-Trevino, I. & N. Dec. 687 (A.G. 2008), where counsel only
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ria by which EOIR adjudicators make future custody decisions by
designating a case as binding precedent.84 In Matter of D-J-, the At-
torney General reversed decisions by an immigration judge and the
Board of Immigration Appeals to release an individual seeking asy-
lum. His decision was reasoned from explicitly political grounds, or
what he termed “sound immigration policy:”85 general deterrence
of future asylum seekers,86 and a desire for increased security after
the attacks of September 11, 2001.87 He designated the decision
precedential, effectively ordering all EOIR officers to rely on non-
individualized criteria to deny release to persons seeking asylum.88
Procedural barriers raised by DOJ rulemaking further stymie
impartial detention review. A custody review by DOJ comes only if
the detained individual knows to request one. A universal right to
government-appointed counsel in removal proceedings has not
been recognized, and only 18% of pro se individuals in detention
receive a custody review before DOJ, compared with 44% of those
with representation.89 Uniquely in U.S. detention law, at an immi-
gration custody hearing the detained individual bears the burden
of persuading the adjudicator that she should be released.90 Fi-
nally, where DOJ grants release, DHS may once again assume the
role of detention adjudicator by automatically staying release
through a ministerial filing.91 Separately, the Board of Immigration
Appeals may preliminarily stay a release order on its own discretion
while it considers a DHS appeal.92 Neither a showing of likelihood
of success on the merits of an appeal nor irreparable harm if re-
lease is granted is required for a stay to take effect.
Individuals in mandatory detention lack even the limited ave-
nues of detention review described above. If a mandatorily de-
received notice of referral to Attorney General, but provided no indication of the
reasons for the referral, the issues to be considered on review, or any briefing sched-
ule or procedures to be followed).
84 See Matter of D-J-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 572, 581 (A.G.  2003) (“[T]his opinion consti-
tutes binding precedent, requiring the BIA and IJs to apply the standards set forth
herein.”).
85 Id. at 579.
86 Id. 577-81.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 581-83 (designating decision precedential and questioning the constitu-
tional need for individualized custody hearing, stating that non-individualized criteria
can justify detention).
89 See Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven Shafer, A National Study of Access to Counsel in Immi-
gration Court, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 70-71 (2015).
90 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(2) (2017); see also Matter of Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 38
(BIA 2006).
91 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(i)(2).
92 Id. § 1003.19(i)(1).
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tained individual requests a custody review before DOJ, the agency
denies jurisdiction to make a determination of dangerousness or
flight risk.93 Those detained due to a prior criminal conviction may
seek a narrower form of review from an immigration judge that
does not concern dangerousness or flight risk, but instead asks the
detained individual to prove that she was erroneously incarcerated
because DHS is “substantially unlikely to establish the charge of
deportability.”94 The burden of persuasion in this posture has
been criticized by one Court of Appeals judge as “all-but-
insurmountable.”95
DOJ review of DHS detention decisions therefore fails to
meaningfully separate the jailer from the judge. Only a quarter of
DHS’s detention decisions are reviewable by DOJ at all. That review
takes place before an adjudicator appointed by the executive’s
chief law enforcement officer, under procedural and substantive
rules enacted in response to the executive’s immigration enforce-
ment priorities. If a DOJ adjudicator orders release from deten-
tion, her decision is summarily reversible by an immigration
enforcement officer from DHS or the Attorney General.
2. Habeas Corpus During Removal Proceedings
If an individual challenges immigration detention pending re-
moval proceedings by habeas corpus in federal court, DOJ and
DHS collaborate to advocate for continued confinement. Prior to
the filing of a habeas petition, DHS may transfer a detained indi-
vidual to a jurisdiction where her claims for release or review are
restricted by unfavorable law.96 In federal court, DOJ represents
DHS in opposition to the detained individual’s release, advancing
arguments in defense of detention that DHS did not make in im-
migration court. In cases of mandatory detention, for example,
DHS is not required to justify to an immigration judge the constitu-
93 Matter of Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. 799, 802 (BIA 1999) (“The regulations gener-
ally do not confer jurisdiction on Immigration Judges over custody or bond determi-
nations respecting those aliens subject to mandatory detention.”).
94 The standard was created by the BIA in Matter of Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. 799,
806. (BIA 1999). More than 90% of Joseph hearing appeals result in continued deten-
tion. See Julie Dona, Making Sense of “Substantially Unlikely”: An Empirical Analysis of the
Joseph Standard in Mandatory Detention Custody Hearings, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 65, 74
tbl.2 (2011).
95 Tijani v. Willis, 430 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 2005) (Tashima, J., concurring).
96 See, e.g., Calla-Collado v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 663 F.3d 680, 685 (3d Cir. 2011)
(stating that a transfer to another state did not violate constitutional rights because
the detainee had the same rights and privileges, such as the right to present evidence
and witnesses, whether the deportation proceeding was in Louisiana or New Jersey).
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tionality of its opposition to a bond hearing.97 But before a federal
judge at habeas, DOJ supplies the missing constitutional argument
that, if accepted, permits continued detention of the habeas peti-
tioner without review of the individual need for detention.
Some lower courts have used the mere availability of habeas
corpus to dismiss due process challenges to detention adjudication
by the executive.98 But due process in detention decisions and the
availability of habeas are distinct questions.99 Moreover, habeas as
currently administered fails to enforce the separation of judge and
jailer that due process demands. Congress has legislated the Execu-
tive’s role as judge in immigration detention by denying federal
courts jurisdiction to review dangerousness or flight risk, the actual
need for an individual’s detention.100 Habeas challenges are there-
fore limited to constitutional or statutory interpretation questions
concerning the detention framework.101 A common habeas chal-
lenge to mandatory immigration detention, for example, argues
that the Due Process Clause prohibits detention for a prolonged
period without an individualized finding of dangerousness or flight
risk.102 The Courts of Appeals that have reached the issue univer-
sally agree that, at some point, detention becomes illegal if such an
individualized finding is not made.103 But federal courts that find a
detention illegally prolonged commonly order a bond hearing
rather than release.104 In most cases, they decline to adjudicate the
bond hearing, instead ordering an immigration judge to do so.105
97 See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez-Roque, 301 F.3d 39, 47 (2d Cir. 2002)
(“[C]onstitutional claims lie outside the BIA’s jurisdiction . . . .”).
98 See, e.g., Hernandez-Carrera v. Carlson, 547 F.3d 1237, 1255 (10th Cir. 2008)
(“[A]liens who believe that their continued detention is unlawful may challenge ICE’s
determination by seeking a writ of habeas corpus in federal court. This is sufficient to
satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause.”); Levario-Garcia v. Prim, No. 16
C 11364, 2017 WL 1181592, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 2017) (“Simply asserting that a
third party should be the decision maker in a post custody review is not sufficient to
show a due process violation, and as such, the court finds Levario-Garcia’s due process
claim to be without merit.”).
99 See infra note 129 (discussing Court’s refusal to decide whether extraterritorial
detainees were entitled to due process in addition to habeas corpus review).
100 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) (2017).
101 See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 516-17 (2003).
102 See Sopo v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 825 F.3d 1199 (11th Cir. 2016); Reid v. Donelan,
819 F.3d 486 (1st Cir. 2016); Lora v. Shanahan, 804 F.3d 601 (2d Cir. 2015); Rodri-
guez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2015); Diop v. ICE/Homeland Sec., 656 F.3d
221 (3d Cir. 2011); Hoang Minh Ly v. Hansen, 351 F.3d 263 (6th Cir. 2003).
103 See Sopo, 825 F.3d at 1199; Reid, 819 F.3d at 486; Lora, 804 F.3d at 601; Rodri-
guez, 804 F.3d at 1060; Diop, 656 F.3d at 221; Hoang Minh Ly, 351 F.3d at 263.
104 See Sopo, 825 F.3d at 1199; Reid, 819 F.3d at 486; Lora, 804 F.3d at 601; Rodri-
guez, 804 F.3d at 1060; Diop, 656 F.3d at 221; Hoang Minh Ly, 351 F.3d at 263.
105 See, e.g., Chiao Fang Ku v. Bowen, No. 17-CV-00760, 2017 WL 2888584, *2 (M.D.
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Thus, courts find ongoing confinement to be unconstitutional, but
nonetheless remand to the law enforcement agency opposing re-
lease for the ultimate decision as to whether an individual should
be detained.106
Effective habeas review is also hampered by more practical
matters. Ex-post habeas review of the executive’s ex-ante detention
adjudication often arrives too late to check the Executive’s role as
ultimate arbiter of immigration detention.107 Federal courts al-
ready face a historical surge in their immigration dockets.108 As the
number of detained individuals has increased, so too have the
number of habeas petitions challenging detention.109 Depending
on the circuit, review of an immigration detention habeas petition
takes, on average, from five-and-a-half to nineteen months.110 By
the time a habeas petition is adjudicated, the detained individual
may have been released because she renounced a meritorious
claim for immigration status and accepted deportation, unable to
withstand indefinite incarceration.111 Where the deportation case
ended in a grant or maintenance of immigration status while a
habeas petition was pending, released individuals were forced to
endure a detention in which they should never have been held.112
Under the current system of post-hoc, limited judicial review,
Pa. June 7, 2017) (“Federal courts frequently defer to immigration judges under these
circumstances, as opposed to conducting their own bond hearings.” (citations
omitted)).
106 Cf. Leamer v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 540 (3d Cir. 2002) (“The underlying pur-
pose of proceedings under the Great Writ of habeas corpus has traditionally been to
inquire into the legality of the detention, and the only judicial relief authorized was
the discharge of the prisoner or his admission to bail, and that only if his detention
were found to be unlawful.” (quoting Note, Powers of Congress and the Court Regarding
the Availability and Scope of Review, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1551, 1553-54 (2001)) (internal
quotations omitted)).
107 Cf. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for E. Dist. of Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 317–18
(1972) (“The independent check upon executive discretion is not satisfied, as the
Government argues, by ‘extremely limited’ post-surveillance judicial review.” (foot-
note omitted)).
108 See, e.g., Lora, 804 F.3d at 615-16 (noting the surge of the immigration dockets’
size in the Second and Ninth Circuits) (citing John R.B. Palmer, The Nature and Causes
of the Immigration Surge in the Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Analysis, 51 N.Y. L.
SCH. L. REV. 13, 14 (2006-2007)).
109 Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, Suits Challenging Confinement of
Noncitizens Jump, TRACREPORTS (Feb. 21, 2017), https://perma.cc/TWN4-QDXG
(showing a 76% increase in habeas suits challenging immigration detention in five-
year period from 2012 to 2017).
110 See Brief of Amici Curiae Americans for Immigrant Justice, et al. in Support of
Respondents at 31, Jennings v. Rodriguez (2016) (No. 15-1204), 2017 WL 564164.
111 See, e.g., id. at *13-17.
112 See, e.g., id. at *19-21 (describing individual cases where the noncitizen placed in
removal proceedings had legal status to remain in the United States).
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contemporary immigration detention has surged in scope and di-
minished in precision. Immigration detention is now “the largest
detention and supervised release program in the country.”113 To-
day, the executive branch holds over 40,000 people a day in immi-
gration detention,114 a more than five-fold increase in the daily
detention population since reforms to detention law in 1996.115
The current president has pledged to “deport or incarcerate” two
to three million noncitizens.116 Meanwhile, as much as 11.7% of
removal cases are terminated because the government cannot
prove alienage or deportability.117 Even more sobering, about 1.5%
of immigration detention and removal decisions are carried out
against citizens.118 By these percentages, a hypothetical target of
three million enforcement actions means erroneous detention or
deportation of as many as 351,000 noncitizens and 45,000 citizens.
Limited, post-hoc habeas review from a detention cell or foreign
country is an insufficient protection for deprivations of liberty of
such magnitude.
III. UNCOVERING STRUCTURAL DUE PROCESS IN IMMIGRATION
DETENTION CASE LAW
If the Due Process Clause demands a separation of jailer and
judge in immigration detention, why have courts not so explained
in previous decisions? While the Supreme Court has yet to explic-
itly acknowledge the historical roots of structural limitations on
government detention, evidence of its views on the matter can be
discerned from the modern immigration detention cases Zadvydas
v. Davis and Demore v. Kim.119 In each case, the rationales of the
majority and dissenting opinions hinged on a central assumption
113 DORA SCHRIRO, IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENF’T, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SE-
CURITY, IMMIGRATION DETENTION OVERVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS 2 (2009), https://
perma.cc/AZJ4-N2EQ.
114 Devlin Barret, Record Immigrant Numbers Force Homeland Security to Search for New
Jail Space, WALL STREET J. (Oct. 21, 2016, 5:30 AM), https://perma.cc/7WD3-WM4A.
115 SCHRIRO, supra note 113, at 2 (reporting an average daily population of 7,500 in
1995); see also Denise Gilman, To Loose the Bonds: The Deceptive Promise of Freedom from
Pretrial Immigration Detention, 92 IND. L.J. 157, 176-78 (2016) (describing how law re-
forms in the 1990s increased the use of immigration detention).
116 60 Minutes: The 45th President (CBS News broadcast Nov. 13, 2016), https://per
ma.cc/2EKF-GVGN.
117 Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, Share of Immigration Cases Ending in
Deportation Order Hits Record Low, TRACIMMIGRATION (Feb. 7, 2012), https://perma
.cc/T3N5-PVTC.
118 Jacqueline Stevens, U.S. Government Unlawfully Detaining and Deporting U.S. Citi-
zens as Aliens, 18 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 606, 629 (2011).
119 Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
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of due process as either a structural limit on the government’s abil-
ity to detain or an individual right to liberty. Where due process
was interpreted as a structural limit, the Court expressed greater
skepticism of the constitutionality of the government’s detention
practices. Below, I examine discussions of these issues in Zadvydas
and Demore. I then conclude with proposals on how courts might
separate the jailer from the judge in immigration detention.
Before turning to the cases, I consider a challenge to the argu-
ment that consideration of structural implications of due process
leads to a meaningfully different constitutional analysis of immigra-
tion detention. Perhaps a structural limit on government actually
derives from a personal right to due process. If that were the case,
then a noncitizen’s right to invoke structural limits would arguably
be limited by the same restrictions that deny her the right to proce-
dural protections. It would thus make no difference whether a
noncitizen’s due process challenge to immigration detention was
analyzed through the lens of limits or rights.120
In many areas of law, in fact, the “line dividing structural limi-
tations from individual rights ‘is elusive at best, if not downright
illusory.’”121 Substantive rights—to assemble and petition, to crimi-
nal trial by jury, to freedom from unreasonable searches and
seizures—protect individuals by limiting government action based
on structural principles of representation or separation of pow-
ers.122 In this sense, “there is no hermetic separation between indi-
vidual rights and structural or systemic processes of governance.”123
Instead, constitutional “rights” can be understood as “linguistic or
rhetorical tools the law deploys for pragmatic reasons and aims,”
which exist in order “to maintain appropriate structural relation-
ships of authority.”124
120 See Kermit Roosevelt III, Guantanamo and the Conflict of Laws: Rasul and Beyond,
153 U. PA. L. REV. 2017, 2054 (2005) (“[A] person seeking to resist governmental
action must usually invoke a right sufficient to overcome the exercise of government
power. And indeed, modern due process jurisprudence is typically concerned with
what rights are contained in the Due Process Clause, rather than the limits of govern-
mental power.” (footnotes omitted)).
121 Jules Lobel, Separation of Powers, Individual Rights, and the Constitution Abroad, 98
IOWA L. REV. 1629, 1654 (2013) (quoting Stephen I. Vladeck, The Suspension Clause as
a Structural Right, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 275, 276 (2008)).
122 See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1205
(1991) (“Like the original Constitution, the original Bill of Rights was webbed with
structural ideas.”).
123 Eve Brensike Primus, A Structural Vision of Habeas Corpus, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 3
(2010).
124 Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms,
and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD 725, 730, 734 (1998).
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How rights function in law generally, however, does not accu-
rately describe how they function in immigration doctrine, where
the individual entitlement to constitutional rights is not as-
sumed.125 Instead, the degree to which a person possesses a partic-
ular right depends on immigration status, with some rights
possessed only by citizens or, in some cases, individuals with a spe-
cific type of immigration status.126 It is this very argument that the
government has used to justify indefinite detention of noncitizens
without judicial review.127 When courts accept this argument, the
“right” to due process affords limited or no protection of a nonci-
tizen’s liberty.
In contrast, reasoning from structural limits on the govern-
ment’s ability to detain has resulted in protection of noncitizens’
liberty. In Boumediene v. Bush, for example, the Court found within
the Suspension Clause a constitutional limit to the executive’s au-
thority to detain noncitizens without judicial review.128 Even assum-
ing without deciding that Guantanamo detainees had no personal
right to due process, the Court evoked “troubling separation-of-
powers concerns” to hold that the detainees could challenge their
detention at habeas.129 In its opinion, the Court viewed the Consti-
tution’s separation-of-powers structure to be like the substantive
guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments in that they
both protect persons as well as citizens.130 That common protec-
125 See, e.g., Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 522 (2003) (“[T]his Court has firmly and
repeatedly endorsed the proposition that Congress may make rules as to aliens that
would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.”) (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678,
718 (2001) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“The liberty rights of the aliens before us here
are subject to limitations and conditions not applicable to citizens . . . .”)).
126 See, e.g., Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (“[A]n alien seeking initial
admission to the United States requests a privilege and has no constitutional rights
regarding his application. . . . [H]owever, once an alien gains admission to our coun-
try and begins to develop the ties that go with permanent residence his constitutional
status changes accordingly.”) (citations omitted).
127 See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 692 (“The Government argues that, from a constitu-
tional perspective, alien status itself can justify indefinite detention . . . .”).
128 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (holding that noncitizens detained as
enemy combatants in Guantanamo Bay may seek judicial review of their detention by
habeas corpus).
129 See id. at 764. The Court in Boumediene left unanswered the question of whether
the substitutes for habeas review provided by the government satisfied the Due Pro-
cess Clause. See id. at 785.
130 Id. at 743 (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886)). Both separa-
tion of powers and the amendments presumably protect individual liberty. Boumediene
permitted noncitizens to challenge their detention through habeas corpus. In Yick Wo
v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), cited in Boumediene as support for a substantive guar-
antee of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court discontinued the detention of Chi-
nese petitioners who were imprisoned under a state law for operating laundry
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tion can be explained by a shared structural principle that govern-
ment must separate jailer from judge when depriving an individual
of liberty. Thus, “foreign nationals who have the privilege of litigat-
ing in our courts can seek to enforce separation-of-powers princi-
ple[s],”131 expressed not only in the Suspension Clause, but in the
Due Process Clause as well.
As Boumediene affirms, where invocation of personal rights has
failed to constrain the government from depriving a noncitizen of
liberty without meaningful procedural protections, reliance on
structural limits may succeed.132 Thus, even if individual rights and
structural limits are generally indistinguishable, in the law of nonci-
tizen detention there exists a material distinction between constitu-
tional protection that is structural—“the government may not
detain without judicial review”—and personal—“the government
may not detain me without judicial review.”133 Boumediene was de-
cided after the Court’s most recent reviews of the constitutionality
of immigration detention practices in Zadvydas and Demore.134 But
as explained below, its distinction between personal and structural
rights was already present in immigration detention doctrine.
businesses in wooden buildings without a permit. The Yick Wo Court considered the
permit-granting system to give state officers “authority to withhold their assent, with-
out reason and without responsibility. The power given to them is not confided to
their discretion in the legal sense of that term, but is granted to their mere will.” Id. at
356-57. Though holding the permit system a violation of the Equal Protection Clause,
the Court’s focus on preventing “purely arbitrary” enforcement that “acknowledges
neither guidance nor restraint” recalls the rationale for structural separation of jailer
and judge contained in the Due Process Clause.
131 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. at 743 (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,
958–59 (1983)); cf. Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 223–24 (2011) (Just as it is
appropriate for an individual, in a proper case, to invoke separation-of-powers or
checks-and-balances constraints, so too may a litigant, in a proper case, challenge a
law as enacted in contravention of constitutional principles of federalism.”).
132 See also Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 YALE L.J. 909, 914 (1991)
(“In particular situations, someone who lacks a constitutional right may nonetheless
be sufficiently protected by an enforceable nonconstitutional norm . . . .”).
133 Boumediene is not typically thought of as an immigration case, as the executive
relied on military rather than immigration detention authority at Guantanamo. See
also Faiza W. Sayed, Challenging Detention: Why Immigrant Detainees Receive Less Process
Than “Enemy Combatants” and Why They Deserve More, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1835
(2011) (“[E]xecutive detention of immigrants and alleged ‘enemy combatants’ has
unsurprisingly spawned numerous court challenges and entire fields of academic
scholarship. But despite their similarities, the two forms of detention have not been
compared . . . .”). But if a constitutional limit on the executive’s ability to alone adju-
dicate detention exists for noncitizen enemy combatants, it is difficult to deny the
same for noncitizen noncombatants.
134 Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
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A. Zadvydas v. Davis
Zadvydas v. Davis concerned a statute that permitted “indefi-
nite, perhaps permanent” detention following a final order of re-
moval.135 Both petitioners in the consolidated case had been
ordered removed, but one was stateless and the other hailed from
a country that lacked a repatriation agreement with the United
States.136 The U.S. government was therefore unable to execute
their removal orders. Relying on a statute that stated “the Govern-
ment ‘may’ continue to detain an alien who still remains here”
ninety days after a removal order has been issued, the government
opted to detain them indefinitely.137 In order to make the decision
for indefinite detention, a panel staffed by the jailer (at that time,
Immigration and Naturalization Services, or “INS”) reviewed the
individual detainee’s file and optionally conducted an interview.138
In order to secure release, the detainee bore the burden of proving
she was neither dangerous nor likely to flee.139 If release were de-
nied, the panel would review the continued need for detention ei-
ther within a year, or, at the panel’s discretion, within a shorter
time,.140
Writing for the majority, Justice Breyer noted that the Due
Process Clause mandates that a deprivation of liberty “bear[ ] [a]
reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual [was]
committed.”141 The detention at issue in Zadvydas appeared to lack
that reasonable relation because while the government claimed it
was for the purposes of carrying out removal, the individuals de-
tained might never be removed.142 The majority therefore found
that serious constitutional concerns compelled a reading of the
statute that did not authorize indefinite detention.143 Instead, the
statute permitted detention for a presumptively reasonable period
of six months.144 After that period, a detained person could seek
review of her confinement by habeas, and “if removal is not reason-
ably foreseeable, the court should hold continued detention un-
135 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 692.
136 Id. at 684-87.
137 See id. at 683 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (2017)).
138 Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(i) (2017)).
139 Id. at 678, 683 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(d)(1)).
140 Id. at 684 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(k)(2)(iii), (v)).
141 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (citing Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S.
715, 738 (1972)) (alterations in original).
142 Id. at 690 (“[B]y definition the first justification—preventing flight—is weak or
nonexistent where removal seems a remote possibility at best.”)
143 Id. at 699.
144 Id. at 701.
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reasonable and no longer authorized by statute.”145 Both
petitioners’ cases were remanded to district courts to analyze
whether removal was reasonably foreseeable. In the case of the pe-
titioner whose country of origin refused to accept deportees, the
district court was to give “due weight to the likelihood of successful
future negotiations” for repatriation.146
Zadvydas was a holding of statutory interpretation, but seven
Justices, including two dissenters, agreed that, at a minimum, “both
removable and inadmissible aliens are entitled to be free from de-
tention that is arbitrary or capricious.”147 The reasons for that
agreement indicate how the Court might decide questions of struc-
tural due process in immigration detention. The majority framed
its opinion in terms of proper institutional roles, summarizing the
government’s rejected position as “‘whether to continue to detain
such an alien and, if so, in what circumstances and for how long’ is
up to the Attorney General, not up to the courts.”148 In contrast,
the dissents focused squarely on the limited access that noncitizens
had to due process rights. The opinions thus hinged on whether
freedom from arbitrary detention was a matter of structural limits
or individual rights.
The majority’s constitutional analysis began by noting that the
Due Process Clause forbids the government to act in certain man-
ners.149 The serious constitutional problem caused by the statute at
issue was obvious, in part, because the sole procedural protections
available were administrative proceedings without significant later
judicial review.150 The Due Process Clause placed important consti-
tutional limitations on Congress’s plenary power to create immi-
gration law, limitations that went beyond “freedom from detention
that is arbitrary or capricious.”151 In fact, the majority opined,
“[t]he Constitution may well preclude granting an administrative
body the unreviewable authority to make determinations implicat-
ing fundamental rights.”152 Because of such constitutional con-
cerns, the majority rejected the government’s argument that the
145 Id. at 699-700.
146 See id. at 702.
147 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695, 721 (2001) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
148 Id. at 689.
149 Id. at 690.
150 Id. at 691; see also Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 87 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting) (“[U]nder certain circumstances, the constitutional requirement of due pro-
cess is a requirement of judicial process.”).
151 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 694-95 (2001).
152 Id. at 692 (quoting Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst., Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S.
445, 450 (1985)) (internal quotations omitted).
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judicial branch must defer to executive and legislative decision
making in immigration detention matters.153
Numerous structural due process concerns were voiced in the
majority opinion. The Due Process Clause was interpreted as a lim-
iting principle that forbade the government from acting, rather
than a declaration of a right to liberty variable according to immi-
gration status.154 The serious constitutional problem at issue was
“obvious” because a determination of a fundamental right—free-
dom from detention—was left to the executive alone, without “sig-
nificant” judicial review. The Due Process Clause therefore
provided a structural right to a separation of jailer and judge, such
that the judiciary need not defer to the political branches’ determi-
nations of an individual’s liberty. The habeas remedy envisioned by
the majority reinforced this structural due process guarantee. The
Court rejected the government’s proposed compromise solution to
the constitutional problem: a habeas action where the reviewing
court would largely defer to “the Government’s view about whether
the implicit statutory limitation is satisfied in a particular case, con-
ducting little or no independent review of the matter.”155 Ulti-
mately, independence in detention decision making was the
remedy for the Court’s serious constitutional concerns.
Viewed in this light, Zadvydas concerned not only the minimal
due process rights of a noncitizen in indefinite detention, but the
judiciary’s constitutionally structured role as an independent re-
viewer of a deprivation of liberty carried out by the political
branches.156 This structural focus distinguished the Court’s due
process analysis from the typical rights-based paradigm used in im-
migration cases and aligned it instead with Boumediene, an execu-
tive detention case concerned with structural limits and separation
of powers. The structural point was bolstered by the majority’s di-
rective that habeas courts “take appropriate account of [the execu-
tive branch’s immigration-related expertise] without abdicating
their legal responsibility to review the lawfulness of an alien’s con-
tinued detention.”157 The legal responsibility of detention review
153 See id. at 695.
154 The majority’s phrasing moves beyond the syntax of the Clause itself, which
does not specify to whom it is addressed. See Rosenkranz, supra note 23, at 1041
(“[The Due Process Clause] is written in the passive voice. It invites the question de-
prived by whom?” (emphasis in original)).
155 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699.
156 The Court’s defense of individual rights in the case is tepidly expressed as “an
alien’s liberty interest is, at the least, strong enough to raise a serious question” re-
garding the constitutionality of indefinite detention. Id. at 696.
157 Id. at 700.
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fell to the judiciary alone, even in matters touching immigration.
In contrast, the dissenters assumed that Zadvydas was, at heart,
an individual rights case. Justice Scalia began with a “careful
description” of the substantive right claimed:158 a “right of release
into this country by an individual who concededly has no legal
right to be here.”159 Assuming that a noncitizen had a diminished
personal right to due process, he then concluded that the political
branches could authorize and execute her indefinite detention.160
Justice Kennedy’s dissent also relied on an assumption of a di-
minished personal right. He found fault with the majority for its
misunderstanding of the petitioners’ liberty interests.161 He consid-
ered those interests, and thus the rights that protected them, “sub-
ject to limitations and conditions not applicable to citizens . . . .”162
That preliminary conclusion decided the question before him.
Reasoning from the diminished personal right, Justice Kennedy
overlooked the executive’s role in adjudicating the propriety of de-
tention without significant judicial review. He thus found that re-
movable persons held pending deportation have “a due process
liberty right to have the INS conduct the review procedures in
place”—the right to detention review by the jailer.163 For individu-
als without any prospects of relief from deportation, ex-post, lim-
ited habeas review was a suitable check on an erroneous
deprivation of liberty. If, for example, the jailer were “to deny an
alien access to the administrative processes in place to review con-
tinued detention, habeas jurisdiction would lie to redress the due
process violation caused by the denial . . . .”164
Nonetheless, Justice Kennedy showed concern for structural
constitutional considerations when he accused the majority of
“committing its own grave constitutional error” by ordering lower
courts to review the likelihood of successful repatriation negotia-
158 Id. at 702 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302
(1993)).
159 Id. at 703 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
160 Id. at 703 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
161 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 718 (2001) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“As per-
sons within our jurisdiction, the aliens are entitled to the protection of the Due Pro-
cess Clause.”).
162 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976)
(“In the exercise of its broad power over naturalization and immigration, Congress
regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.”)).
163 Id. at 721 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
164 Id. at 724 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Presumably, Justice Kennedy’s habeas court
would remand to the executive for administration of the denied procedures. See dis-
cussion infra Section II, for a discussion of the problems with the remedy.
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tions.165 His concern was the perceived “systemic dislocation in the
balance of powers” caused by requiring the executive to give the
judiciary an account of negotiations related to international rela-
tions.166 But the majority’s habeas remedy did not assume the exec-
utive’s role to negotiate a repatriation agreement. It simply asked
for an evidence-based representation of the progress made toward
that agreement.
The executive’s role in adjudicating immigration detention is
an even more direct example of the “systemic dislocation” that pre-
occupied Justice Kennedy in Zadvydas. Toward the conclusion of
his dissent, he expressed interest in addressing that matter when
he asked rhetorically “whether, and to what extent, a habeas court
could review the Attorney General’s determination that a detained
alien continues to be dangerous or a flight risk,”167 and alluded to
the possible existence of “substantial questions concerning the se-
verity necessary for there to be a community risk; the adequacy of
judicial review in specific cases where it is alleged there is no justifi-
cation for concluding an alien is dangerous or a flight risk; and
other issues.”168 His proposed constitutional safeguard in Zadvydas
even acknowledged a role for the judiciary, suggesting that courts
“review a single, discrete case deciding whether there were fair pro-
cedures and adequate judicial safeguards to determine whether an
alien is dangerous to the community so that long-term detention is
justified.”169
165 Id. at 705 (2001) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
166 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 705 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). According to Jus-
tice Kennedy, this was a serious misconception of the proper judicial function be-
cause it carried the possibility of questioning the executive “respecting its ongoing
negotiations in the international sphere.” Id. at 725.
167 Id. at 724 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
168 Id. at 724-25 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
169 Id. at 725 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). The specification of a
judicial safeguard contradicted Justice Kennedy’s earlier suggestion that “the review
process need not include a judicial officer or formal court proceeding, but could be
conducted by a neutral administrative official.” 533 U.S. 678 at 723 (Kennedy, J., dis-
senting) (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 486 (1972)). Justice Kennedy bor-
rowed that suggestion from Morrissey v. Brewer, a challenge to the review process for
parole eligibility and revocation. Morrissey, 408 U.S. 471. The analogy appears closer if
reasoned from the individual rights paradigm, in which an individual with a criminal
conviction, like an individual with an order of removal, has a lesser liberty interest
and thus a lesser right to due process. However, the use of a nonjudicial officer in the
parole context could also be consistent with the division of jailer and judge because of
extensive judicial participation in the underlying criminal matter. The decision to
impose a criminal sentence, after all, is typically made by the judiciary, at the resolu-
tion of a proceeding a judicial officer oversaw and administered for fairness.
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B. Demore v. Kim
Two years after deciding Zadvydas, the Court considered the
constitutionality of mandatory detention, or incarceration without
a bond hearing, of a lawful permanent resident (“LPR”) during
removal proceedings. In Demore v. Kim, the Court held that Con-
gress may require that noncitizens be detained without bond for
the brief period necessary for their removal proceedings.170 At its
most expansive, that holding would permit detention without bond
for the indefinite period that removal proceedings last. The Courts
of Appeals have unanimously disagreed with that reading of
Demore, however, limiting mandatory detention to a reasonable pe-
riod, after which a bond hearing is constitutionally compelled.171
As of this writing, the scope of Demore’s holding remains pending
before the Supreme Court, one of several issues in Jennings v.
Rodriguez.172
Concern with systemic infirmities, rather than individual liber-
ties, animated the Demore majority’s opinion. The majority focused
on the “wholesale failure by the INS to deal with increasing rates of
criminal activity by aliens.”173 It argued that the executive’s “near-
total inability to remove deportable criminal aliens” was a systemic
flaw of immigration enforcement, supporting its conclusion with
statistics on noncitizen criminal incarceration and criminal and im-
migration recidivism that Congress had considered when authoriz-
ing mandatory detention.174 Writing in dissent, Justice Souter
critiqued the majority’s systemic focus, arguing that “the only rea-
sonable starting point is the traditional doctrine concerning the
Government’s physical confinement of individuals.”175
Still, both the majority opinion and Justice Souter’s dissent
adopted the individual rights-focused analyses of the dissents in
Zadvydas. Systemic considerations were only relevant to the major-
ity because it had already decided that noncitizens possessed di-
minished or no individual due process rights. It therefore
“endorsed the proposition that Congress may make rules as to
170 Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 513 (2003).
171 See Sopo v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 825 F.3d 1199 (11th Cir. 2016); Reid v. Donelan,
819 F.3d 486 (1st Cir. 2016); Lora v. Shanahan, 804 F.3d 601 (2d Cir. 2015); Rodri-
guez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2015); Diop v. ICE/Homeland Sec., 656 F.3d
221 (3d Cir. 2011); Hoang Minh Ly v. Hansen, 351 F.3d 263 (6th Cir. 2003).
172 Jennings v. Rodriguez, 136 S. Ct. 2489 (2016) (granting cert.).
173 Demore, 538 U.S. at 518 (citations omitted).
174 Id. at 518-19.
175 Id. at 547 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (footnote
omitted).
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aliens that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens,” including
statute-based categorical presumptions of dangerousness and flight
risk that might not be speedily judicially reviewed.176 Under this
rights-focused analysis, when the government deals with deportable
persons, the Due Process Clause does not require compliance with
traditional constitutional restrictions on the deprivation of
liberty.177
Justice Souter’s dissent disagreed with the majority’s conclu-
sion, but not its analytical framework.178 Grounding his constitu-
tional analysis in discussion of rights rather than limits, he viewed
noncitizens residing in the United States as “entitled” to the safe-
guards of the Constitution.179 In his view, the majority simply
weighed the rights at issue incorrectly, “forget[ting] over a century
of precedent acknowledging the rights of permanent residents, in-
cluding the basic liberty from physical confinement lying at the
heart of due process.”180
As a result, Justice Souter felt obligated to address the extent
to which a noncitizen possessed a personal right to due process. He
argued that a lawful permanent resident deserved due process be-
cause of “practical” similarities with a citizen: domestic domicile,
payment of taxes, military service,181 “stronger family, social, and
economic ties here than some who have become naturalized citi-
zens[,]” and the ability to apply for citizenship.182 He then insisted
that his analysis would only determine the constitutionality of
mandatory detention of LPRs.183 But why? Like an LPR, an un-
176 See id. at 522 (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 718 (2001) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (“The liberty rights of the aliens before us here are subject to limitations
and conditions not applicable to citizens.”)).
177 See id. at 528.
178 Justice Souter briefly hinted at the separation of powers guarantees that the Due
Process Clause carries. In a footnote, he questioned “whether due process requires
access to any particular arbiter, such as one unaffiliated with the INS.” Id. at 540 n.1
(Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
179 Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 543 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (emphasis added) (“Aliens ‘residing in the United States for a
shorter or longer time, are entitled, so long as they are permitted by the government
of the United States to remain in the country, to the safeguards of the Constitution,
and to the protection of the laws, in regard to their rights of person and of property,
and to their civil and criminal responsibility.’” (quoting Fong Yue Ting v. United
States, 149 U.S. 698, 724 (1893)).
180 Id. at 541 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
181 See id. at 544-45 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations
omitted).
182 Id. at 545 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Woodby
v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 286 (1966)).
183 Id. at 547 n.8 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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documented or out-of-status noncitizen might live here, pay taxes,
and develop strong family, social, and economic ties. Is military ser-
vice, which LPRs alone among noncitizens may undertake, to be
understood as the source of an individual right to constitutional
due process? Or is Congress’s decision to “establish a uniform rule
of naturalization” for LPRs through a citizenship application sub-
ject to discretionary approval the necessary condition for due pro-
cess?184 If so, it would seem that Congress, rather than the
Constitution, grants due process rights, a conclusion that Justice
Souter’s dissent rejected.
Justice Souter’s analysis displays the internal inconsistency at
the heart of the individual rights-focused analysis of due process in
immigration detention law. To support the existence of an individ-
ual entitlement, Justice Souter emphasized an actual connection to
the national community. By grounding legal protection in actual
facts as opposed to the legal category of immigration status alone,
his approach seems to promise fair government treatment based
on meaningful criteria. But as Demore’s majority opinion shows, an
exclusive focus on personal rights can also work to the noncitizen’s
detriment by establishing artificial tiers of rights-bearers, some
more entitled than others to protections from the same depriva-
tion of liberty.185 Had Justice Souter’s dissent followed the Zadvydas
majority and considered the structural implications of due process,
it would have avoided the debate over which noncitizens deserve
protection from arbitrary deprivation of liberty. Instead, both the
majority and dissent in Demore overlooked the serious separation of
powers concerns presented when the political branches authorize
and execute detention free of judicial review. Though both opin-
ions reached different results, their shared methodology dimin-
ished the Judiciary’s structural role as an independent power that
checks political branch overreach.
C. Achieving Separation of Jailer and Judge in Immigration Detention
What solutions exist for structural due process concerns in im-
migration detention? The most direct way to separate jailer and
judge in immigration detention would be to constitutionally man-
date judicial review of the executive’s detention decisions. The
184 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
185 See, e.g., Alghazali v. Tsoukaris, No. 16–9055 (JLL), 2017 WL 3191514, at *5
(D.N.J. July 27, 2017) (finding that a noncitizen detained as an applicant for admis-
sion was owed a “lesser level of Due Process rights” than one detained due to prior
criminal convictions and thus upholding as legal detention of fifteen months without
a bond hearing).
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large volume of immigration cases already present on federal court
dockets calls for thoughtful consideration of such a solution. On
the one hand, mandating judicial review of detention would likely
reduce the number of habeas petitions seeking a similar remedy,
but more than replace them with custody hearings. On the other,
habeas proceedings and custody hearings are not comparable in
terms of the complexity of legal questions presented. A greater
number of custody hearings might be held in the same time it
takes for federal courts to adjudicate a lesser number of habeas
petitions. Federal courts are well trained in expeditiously adjudicat-
ing pre-trial criminal detention bail hearings. They might manage
immigration detention bail hearings with equal aplomb. Moreover,
the removal of custody cases from immigration court dockets
would reduce the record backlog of cases before EOIR, which
have, in turn, contributed to delayed removal proceedings and in-
creased rates of prolonged detention pending those proceedings.
Short of true judicial review, procedural alterations to deten-
tion decision-making could at least reapportion some adjudicatory
duties from DHS to another body.186 Two Courts of Appeals have
taken this approach, requiring an automatic bond hearing before
an immigration judge within six months of DHS’s decision to place
an individual in mandatory detention.187 Four other circuit courts
require a bond hearing when detention becomes unreasonable
under the facts and circumstances of the case, a determination
made upon petition to a habeas court.188 Delay associated with ex-
post habeas review makes an automatic time limit a constitutionally
preferable remedy,189 though some of that delay would be elimi-
nated if the habeas court itself conducted a bond hearing rather
than remanding to DOJ. Barring adoption of such a practice, how-
ever, both of these solutions still leave the ultimate decision on cus-
tody to the Executive.190
186 Immigration law frequently employs “procedural surrogates” for analogous con-
stitutional guarantees made to citizens. See Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of
Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L.
REV. 1625, 1665-73 (1992) (describing how courts have given near-conclusive weight
to a noncitizen’s liberty interest in procedural due process analyses to rule against the
government in immigration detention cases).
187 See Lora v. Shanahan, 804 F.3d 601 (2d Cir. 2015); Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804
F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2015).
188 See Sopo v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 825 F.3d 1199 (11th Cir. 2016); Reid v. Donelan,
819 F.3d 486 (1st Cir. 2016); Diop v. ICE/Homeland Sec., 656 F.3d 221 (3d Cir.
2011); Hoang Minh Ly v. Hansen, 351 F.3d 263 (6th Cir. 2003).
189 See supra text accompanying notes 107-112.
190 For discussion of remedies for structural infirmities in immigration adjudication
generally, see generally Lawrence Baum, Judicial Specialization and the Adjudication of
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Moving beyond mandatory detention, other attributes of im-
migration detention merit scrutiny for separation of powers con-
cerns. Some procedural barriers may be so insurmountable that
they practically ensure continued confinement, functionally vest-
ing detention adjudication in the executive branch. The Zadvydas
majority noted constitutional doubts regarding the placement of
the burden of persuasion on the detained individual.191 The dis-
sent raised questions concerning the quantum of proof necessary
to establish dangerousness at an immigration custody hearing.192
Lower courts have questioned the fairness of forcing an individual
in mandatory detention to prove that DHS is substantially unlikely
to establish the charge of deportability in order to receive a bond
hearing.193 Other practices that blur the line between judge and
jailer include DHS’s unchecked authority to control the judicial
forum by transferring the location of immigration detention;194
Immigration Cases, 59 DUKE L.J. 1501, 1553-60 (2010) (discussing proposals to vest ju-
risdiction of appeals of DOJ adjudications to a specialized tribunal); Leonard Bird-
song, Reforming the Immigration Courts of the United States: Why Is There No Will to Make It
an Article I Court?, 19 BARRY L. REV. 17, 21 (2013) (arguing for the establishment of an
Article I court to adjudicate immigration matters); David Hausman, The Failure of Im-
migration Appeals, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1177 (2016) (offering strategies to increase uni-
formity in immigration adjudication); Stephen H. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration
Adjudication, 59 DUKE L.J. 1635, 1636 (2010) (proposing that trial level immigration
adjudication occur at a new executive branch tribunal and appellate adjudication at
an Article III immigration court).
191 Shortly after Congress’s last major reforms of detention laws in 1996, the BIA
reversed a longstanding presumption against detention established by case law. See
Matter of Patel, 15 I. & N. Dec. 666 (BIA 1976). In Matter of Adeniji, 22 I. & N. Dec.
1102 (BIA 1999), the BIA newly held that the detainee bears the burden of persua-
sion at a bond hearing, a shift justified in part by citing to a new regulation that
applied only to INS enforcement officers when reviewing requests for release. Despite
its textual limitation to the INS, the BIA also considered the regulation “binding” on
EOIR. Matter of Adeniji, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 1113. In The Beast of Burden in Immigration
Bond Hearings, 67 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 75, 92 (2016), Mary Holper considers the
reversal troubling because the BIA, as part of the EOIR, would be governed by the
enforcement agency’s own agenda. Holper’s concern is structural in nature. In Matter
of Adenji, the “judge” (or in this case, administrative officer) adopted the jailer’s stan-
dard for detention review.
192 See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 724-25 (2001) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
193 See Tijani v. Willis, 430 F.3d 1241, 1244-46 (9th Cir. 2005) (Tashima, J.,
concurring).
194 Nancy Morawetz writes of “how great the danger is of distorting the rule of law
through mindless application” of venue rules in habeas petitions that permit the gov-
ernment to transfer pending petitions to the district court of its choice by transferring
detention to a geographically isolated center. Nancy Morawetz, Detention Decisions and
Access to Habeas Corpus for Immigrants Facing Deportation, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 13,
32 (2005). In an empirical study of transferred immigration habeas petitions,
Morawetz documents how the Western District of Louisiana systematically denies re-
quests for stays of removal and vacates those previously granted by transferring courts,
resulting in the deportation of individuals with claims for immigration relief pending
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DOJ’s use of unreasonably high bonds to ensure continued deten-
tion even while finding release to be theoretically appropriate;195
and DHS’s substitution of its own judgment on custody for an im-
migration judge’s by use of automatic stays of detention pending
appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals, without any showing
of likelihood of success on the merits of the appeal or irreparable
harm absent the stay of release. Whether such practices are consis-
tent with a true division between the authority to jail and to judge
the lawfulness of incarceration is not a foregone conclusion. But
courts reviewing immigration detention should ask the question
explicitly, exploring systemic attacks on the separation of powers in
addition to the individual burdens on liberty that are their custom-
ary focus.
CONCLUSION
Over the last twenty years, the executive branch has vigorously
guarded its control over immigration detention decisions, sup-
ported by legislative reforms that expelled the judiciary from de-
tention review. “In a government of separated powers, deciding
finally on what is a reasonable degree of guaranteed liberty
whether in peace or war (or some condition in between) is not well
entrusted to the Executive Branch of Government, whose particu-
lar responsibility is to maintain security.”196 Commitment to the
historical meaning of due process also gives courts a particular re-
sponsibility: to maintain the separation of powers between jailer
and judge in immigration detention.
Article III judicial review. She concludes that venue “rules, which allow the govern-
ment to choose the court that will review the legality of controversial government
policies, lend themselves to abuse.” Id. at 33. Peter L. Markowitz and Lindsay C. Nash
also address due process concerns with venue transfers. Markowitz and Nash observe
that “change of venue motions are routinely denied even if the location of proceed-
ings is distant from the immigrant’s place of residence; deprives the immigrant of
access to counsel or evidence; is far from the location of witnesses; and changes the
governing circuit law in ways prejudicial to the immigrant.” Peter L Markowitz & Lind-
say C. Nash, Constitutional Venue, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1153, 1202-03 (2014). They advocate
for a due process inquiry in a fair location. Id. at 1213.
195 See Hernandez v. Lynch, No. EDCV 16-00620-JGB (KKx) (C.D. Cal. Nov. 10,
2016), aff’d sub nom. Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2017) (granting
preliminary injunction requiring immigration judges to consider a respondent’s abil-
ity to pay a bond when setting bond amount).
196 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 545 (2004) (Souter, J., concurring in, dissent-
ing in part, and concurrent in the judgment).
